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THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN EARLY MEDIEVAL EUROPE. Ed-
ited by Wendy Davies and Paul Fouracre. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 1986. Pp. xii, 304. $49.50. 
The structure of The Settlement of Disputes in Early Medieval Eu-
rope 1 is particularly interesting. On the one hand, the work is a 
straightforward miscellany: There are ten individually authored es-
says, each a self-contained, independent endeavor focusing on a dis-
crete geographic region of Europe.2 On the other hand, the work's 
contributors assert that The Settlement of Disputes in Early Medieval 
Europe "is meant to be read as a book and not as a collection of sepa-
rate essays" (p. ix). Read "as a book", the heart of the work is its 
Conclusion, which presents a "common view" and "stand[s] as an ex-
pression of the group approach" (p. ix). 
As a miscellany, all ten of the work's essays make for enjoyable 
reading. The lawyer interested in the history of the common law, 
however, will be primarily interested in the work's sole essay on Eng-
lish law, Patrick Wormald's Charters, Law and the Settlement of Dis-
putes in Anglo-Saxon England (pp. 149-68). In his essay, Mr. 
Wormald infers - from extant examples of "one broad type of char-
ter, the formal record of the settlement of disputes"3 - how parties in 
pre-Conquest England litigated their claims. He concentrates on two 
disputes; one (judgment made in 824) "between Bishop Heahberht (of 
Worcester) and the community of Berkeley, concerning the inheri-
tance of lEthelric, son of lEthelmund" (p. 152), and another (resolved 
in 998) over the rights of St. Andrew's Cathedral (of Rochester) to an 
estate at Snodland, Kent. 
Mr. Wormald draws two conclusions from the record of these dis-
1. Wendy Davies is a Professor of History at University College, London; Paul Fouracre is a 
Lecturer in History at the University of London Goldsmiths' College. 
2. The first four essays discuss regions within France, canvassing fifth- and sixth-century 
Gaul, eighth-century Francia, early ninth-century West Francia, and ninth-century Brittany. 
The remaining six essays cover Spain, Italy, the Byzantine Empire, England, Ireland, and 
Scotland. 
3. P. 2. The passage continues: "(often, then and since, called placitum•)." The asterisk 
signals that the work's Glossary contains an entry for this word. The Glossary defines placitum as 
follows: 
Placitum, pl. placita A word generally used by historians to refer to a specific type of docu-
ment recording the final composition [sic] at the end of a law suit; for example, a mutual 
agreement or a formal royal permission. This usage is attested in early medieval sources, 
but the word has a very much wider range of meanings in classical and late Latin. The 
document now called a placitum appears to have developed only in the sixth century. By 
the eighth century in Francia and Italy, the meaning was extended to that of a public court 
hearing ('an agreement to appear in court' or a 'royal license for a public hearing') and later 
to the whole of a public court-case, across many hearings; and to the document recording 
the case. 
P. 273; Cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1035 (5th ed. 1979). 
1430 
May 1988] Legal History 1431 
putes.4 The first is that "the 'oral-formulaic' approach to Anglo-
Saxon litigation is not borne out by the records of actual pleas" (p. 
167). In other words, courts did not enter judgment against a party 
merely because he sneezed during pleading. The second conclusion is 
that "[t]he Anglo-Saxon state came to play an aggressive and interven-
tionist part in proceedings" (p. 167). That is to say, the Crown was 
willing to institute and utilize a judiciary to protect its interests. 
There is nothing controversial about these conclusions: They are, 
in fact, so uncontroversial that Mr. Wormald must generate his own 
controversy. He claims that an "orthodoxy" (p. 149) exists - a "sub-
stantially entrenched" one at that (p. 149) - which actually holds 
that, in the early Middle Ages, a stutter while pleading skewed a case, 
and that the King was unconcerned with using the courts to maintain 
his hold on the scepter. This "orthodoxy" is chimerical, 5 and Mr. 
Wormald's fixation on the refutation of such a straw man is a sharp 
wound to the integrity of his essay. Over time, it will sap from this 
well-executed piece the lasting merit it otherwise might have enjoyed. 
The contributors to The Settlement of Disputes in Early Medieval 
Europe divide their joint Conclusion into three parts. Part 1, The Role 
of Writing in the Resolution and Recording of Disputes, briefly explains 
4. Mr. Wonnald makes three other observations about these records. Two are mere varia-
tions on his second conclusion, which is discussed in the text. The other is a rather hopeful 
assertion that even though "the case-law evidence is confined to the social and intellectual elite, it 
may be wrong to regard what it implies as remote and unfamiliar for a wider swathe of society." 
P. 167. 
5. On the history of English law, Frederic William Maitland wrote often and well. Mr. 
Wonnald's mistaken belief in a stultified "orthodoxy" is, strangely enough, a tribute to 
Maitland's continued hold on the minds of legal historians. 
To prove the existence of this orthodoxy, Mr. Wonnald produces a long string of quotations 
"from Maitland himself." P. 149 (citing 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898)). Mr. Wonnald concludes that simply because these quotations bear 
Maitland's name, they "have commanded near universal acceptance," (p. 150), and therefore 
must constitute an "orthodoxy." 
The flaw in Mr. Wonnald's conclusion is that Pollock (whose views are far less respected than 
Maitland's) wrote the cited series of quotations. Mr. Wonnald himself, in footnote 91 (the last 
footnote to the essay), grudgingly admits his misascription, and further admits it came to his 
attention only after "this paper went into proof." P. 168 n. 91. Mr. Wonnald tries to justify his 
error on the grounds that "the generally accepted custom ... is to attribute the opinions of the 
History of English Law to Maitland." Id. Yet Maitland's disavowal of the cited passages is a 
matter of public record. THE LETTERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 102, 103 (C. Fifoot 
ed., Selden Society Supplementary Series, Vol. 1, 1965) ("F.P .... has written an Anglo-Saxon 
chapter. Between ourselves I do not like it very much.") (letter 109; emphasis omitted). Perhaps 
one can base an entire orthodoxy on the words "of Maitland himself"; Mr. Wonnald, however, 
should have first made sure it was Maitland's words that he was citing. 
In the same vein, Mr. Wonnald asserts that Anglo-Saxon charters "received the most cursory 
acknowledgement from Maitland." P. 149. Yet Maitland's essay, England Before the Conquest, 
examines, inter alia, charters involving "the church of Worcester" and "the church of Roches-
ter," the same two churches Mr. Worma/d discusses in his article! Maitland, England Before the 
Conquest, in DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND 220, 227-28, 235 (1897). Why doesn't Mr. 
Wonnald cite this essay? Mr. Wonnald takes an unaccountably belligerent attitude towards 
Maitland. He should have at least distinguished Maitland's essay, if only to dispel the otherwise 
attendant odor of less-than-fair play. 
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the "direct relationship" between "the generic diversity and formal 
sophistication of documentary records" and "a society's ability to pre-
serve them" (p. 208). Part 2, Procedure and Practice in the Settlement 
of Disputes, induces - from the inferences reached in the separate 
essays - a general picture of the daily workings of the various legal 
systems instituted by the successor states to the Roman empire. Part 
3, Dispute Processes and Social Structures, explores the relationship 
between early medieval legal systems and their contemporaneous al-
ternatives (such as feuding). 
Part 2 depicts "how the courts actually operated" (p. 217) in the 
following manner: 
Generally we can characterize their procedure as pragmatic - it fol-
lowed logical sequences. If a litigant claimed to have a charter, he was 
told to produce it; if someone reckoned to be able to find supporting 
witnesses, the court would defer the hearing until they appeared; if a 
boundary was in dispute, members of the tribunal would accompany 
both parties to visit the area in questions, and so on. [pp. 217-18] 
Part 3 describes the relationship between legal and "alternative" dis-
pute resolution systems in the early Middle Ages as follows: "Going 
to court . . . often fitted into a set of wider social strategies for each 
party; at the least, the court case was only one part of the dispute and 
its settlement, which could have a far longer time-scale" (p. 233). 
The sketch part 2 gives of medieval legal systems is solidly sup-
ported. Moreover, part 3's description of the integration of medieval 
law and society is a genuine contribution to our understanding of me-
dieval dispute resolution. Yet here too, the straw man lurks, 6 a pres-
ence which in the long run detracts from the Conclusion's overall 
worth. In addition, part 3 indulges in truisms - "courts must have 
been of some use for disputants; we should not assume that people 
went to court out of a disinterested love for the law" (p. 234) - and 
spends far too long discovering what Stewart Macaulay uncovered 
twenty-five years ago: that "one uses or threatens to use legal sanc-
tions to settle disputes when other devices will not work and when the 
gains are thought to outweigh the costs."7 
6. The Conclusion describes its straw man thus: 
A major aim of this book has been to show that the traditional picture of early medieval law, 
as presented in the early twentieth-century legal histories, and indeed still accepted by many 
modem experts on the legal changes of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, cannot be main· 
tained. That picture derived largely from an over-simple reading of Germanic law codes, 
which were too often accepted simply as a straightforward description of what happened in 
courts. 
P. 228 (emphasis added). This reformulation of the "orthodoxy" requires the reader to believe 
that an entire class of experts (in both law and history), confuses codes of civil procedure with 
trial transcripts. 
7. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, 28 AM. Soc. REV. SS, 6S (1963). Part 3 
contends that "[t]he key advantage of going to court was the width of support potentially avail-
able to a party there." P. 234. The cost of going to court was that in court, "the rules of law 
themselves begin to matter. Such rules expressed above all the values of the state .••. " P. 23S. 
In other words, the cost involved was the risk that the state would subordinate the parties' inter-
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Read either as a miscellany or as a unified work, this book is a 
work of minor merit with minor flaws. In the special case of the histo-
rian of comparative law, the overall quality of the other nine essays 
admittedly saves the work. For the common law historian, however, 
this unhappy combination moves The Settlement of Disputes in Early 
Medieval Europe from treatise to divertissement, from a book worth 
reading to one worth reading only in the absence of anything better. 
- David A. Westrup 
ests to its own. The general thrust of part 3 is that a party assumed this risk when, and only 
when, it was advantageous for him to do so. 
